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 Regulating Supply Chains To Protect Road Transport Workers: An Early 
Assessment Of The Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal 
Richard Johnstone,* Igor Nossar* and Michael Rawling* 
 
Abstract 
The Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) (the Act) explicitly enables the Road Safety 
Remuneration Tribunal to make orders that can impose binding requirements on all the 
participants in the road transport supply chain, including consignors and consignees at the apex 
the chain, for the pay and safety of both employee and independent contractor drivers.  The 
tribunal is also specifically empowered to make enforceable orders to reduce or remove 
remuneration related incentives and pressures that contribute to unsafe work practices in the 
road transport industry.  Recently the tribunal handed down its first order. The article considers 
whether, and the degree to which, the tribunal has been willing to exercise its explicit power to 
impose enforceable obligations on consignors and consignees — such as large supermarket 
chains — at the apex of road transport supply chains.  It examines the substance and extent of 
the obligations imposed by the tribunal, including whether the tribunal has exercised the full 
range of powers vested in it by the Act. We contend that the tribunal’s first order primarily 
imposes obligations on direct work providers and drivers without making large, powerful 
consignors and consignees substantively responsible for driver pay and safety. We argue that the 
tribunal’s first order could have more comprehensively fulfilled the objectives of the Act by 
more directly addressing the root causes of low pay and poor safety in the road transport 
industry. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A key feature of organisational arrangements in the contemporary Australian trucking industry is 
the extensive use of contracting chains — what we will refer to in this article as ‘supply chains’ 
— for the supply of road freight services. At the apex of many of these supply chains are 
influential consignors and consignees, such as large supermarket chains, department stores, and 
manufacturers and the firms to which manufactured items are supplied. In a supply chain, the 
consignor, rather than transporting goods using its own truck driven by its own employees, 
contracts with a transport company which in turn uses its own employee drivers, or subcontracts 
the driving work to an owner driver, or, perhaps, to another transport company which itself sub-
contracts the work to an owner driver. Some road freight arrangements involve carting goods 
through distribution centres where freight is unloaded and then loaded on to other trucks.  
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As this description of contracting arrangements shows, the major transport companies that 
directly enter into contracts with consignors to haul their freight, or that receive road transport 
work via an intermediary, are at least one step down the general freight supply chain. As we 
discuss in the next section of this article, over recent decades the bargaining power of transport 
companies relative to many of their client consignors has weakened to the point that many 
transport companies have become the price taker and the consignor the price-maker. Powerful 
consignors and consignees also have the power to set other parameters within which work is 
undertaken by road transport workers, including the maximum time available for delivery of 
goods.1 The transport companies then need directly to engage both employee and contract 
owner drivers to drive the trucks which carry the freight under arrangements that enable the 
transport company to take its share of financial return. To ensure financial return, major 
transport companies sometimes further contract out work to smaller transport company 
operators who will then directly engage the road transport workers – either their own employees, 
or owner drivers. The weight of the cumulative economic pressures from the top of the chain is 
passed down the supply chain and induces intense competition between employee drivers and 
owner drivers who frequently are compelled to accept work terms and conditions dictated to 
them or fail to receive work at all.2  
Thus, in the absence of preventive regulation, drivers at the bottom of the supply chain – 
particularly owner drivers needing work to meet the expenses of owning a truck – are compelled 
to accept low freight rates and unsustainable delivery timetables. These, in turn, provide 
incentives to work longer hours – which can result in fatigue – and to engage in hazardous work 
practices that compromise the health and safety of drivers.3 The literature — which we discuss in 
the next section of the article — shows how the use of elaborate, pyramid subcontracting results 
in reduced freight rates and returns to drivers. It also demonstrates a strong link between low 
returns and client demands for tight time schedules, long hours, and poor queuing practices that 
reduce opportunities for drivers to rest.4 Intensification of these pressures in an already 
competitive industry has resulted in unsafe and unhealthy work practices such as excessive hours 
                                                            
1 See Michael Quinlan, Report of Inquiry into Safety in the Long Haul Trucking Industry, Motor Accidents 
Authority of New South Wales, (2001) 152-153; Re Transport Industry – Mutual Responsibility for Road Safety 
(State) Award and Contract Determination (2006) 158 IR 17 at 24; Igor Nossar, Briefing Paper: Consequential 
Amendments to OHS Amendment (Long Distance Road Freight Transport) Regulation Draft, Textile Clothing and 
Footwear Union of Australia, Sydney (2004) 1. 
2 National Transport Commission, Safe Payments: Addressing the Underlying Causes of Unsafe Practices in the 
Road Transport Industry National Transport Commission, Melbourne (2008) 24-25. 
3 See Michael Quinlan and Lance Wright, Remuneration and Safety in the Australian Heavy Vehicle Industry: A 
Review Undertaken for the National Transport Commission (2008) which found at p 49 ‘that the overwhelming 
weight of evidence indicates that commercial/industrial practices affecting road transport play a direct 
and significant role in causing hazardous practices.’ 
4 Claire Mayhew and Michael Quinlan, ‘Economic Pressure, Multi-tiered Subcontracting and 
Occupational Health and Safety in Australian Long Haul Trucking’ (2006) 28 Employee Relations 212; 
Michael Quinlan, Supply Chains and Networks, Safe Work Australia (2011) 5-6. Note also Stephanie Premji, 
Katherine Lippel and Karen Messing, ‘“We work by the second !” Piecework remuneration and 
occupational health and safety from an ethnicity- and gender-sensitive perspective’ 2008 (10) Perspectives 
interdisciplinaires sur le travail et la santé 2-27, which shows that a connection between pay and safety has been 
found in other industries. 
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of work, increased use of kilometre or trip-based payment systems, speeding, drug use (to 
combat fatigue) and cuts to maintenance.5 
Over the past 15 years, Australian road transport and work health and safety regulators have 
developed various regulatory provisions designed to address the health and safety risks from 
supply chain pressures on drivers. These measures include the ‘chain of responsibility’ provisions 
of the heavy vehicle legislation, now to be found in the Heavy Vehicle National Law,6 which sets 
out ‘a chain of responsibility’ for all parties (including firms packing, loading and receiving 
goods) involved in road transport work even if they have no direct role as a driver or transport 
operator.7 The aim of these provisions is to make each party in the chain with the capacity to 
exercise control or influence over any transport task equally responsible for compliance with the 
road transport laws, including provisions for fatigue management requirements (Chapter 6 of the 
National Heavy Vehicle Law), breaches of speed limits (Chapter 5), and breaches of mass, 
dimension, or loading requirements (Chapter 4). Further, in 2005, New South Wales introduced 
the Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Long Distance Truck Driver Fatigue) Regulation 2005 
(NSW), made under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW). These provisions required 
large consignors, consignees and head carriers to assess risks to employee drivers and owner 
drivers from fatigue in long haul driving arrangements, and to develop a fatigue management 
plan to address identified risks. The regulation was repealed at the end of 2011 when the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act was replaced by the harmonised Work Health and safety Act 2011 
(NSW). 
In addition, since 1979 in NSW, rates and conditions of work for contractor drivers have been 
provided for by ‘contract determinations’ (which are akin to industrial awards) and ‘contract 
agreements’ (similar to union collective agreements).8  These provisions are, however, confined 
to regulating the direct contract worker/hirer arrangement and do not extend to regulate clients 
at the top of the transport supply chain. Also, due to State jurisdictional limitations, they do not 
cover any road transport work beyond NSW local work.9  
Then, in 2012, the Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) (‘the Act‘) established the federal road 
safety remuneration tribunal (‘the tribunal’).The tribunal is responsible for determining working 
conditions in the road transport industry across Australia.  The Act explicitly empowers the 
tribunal to make orders that can impose binding requirements on all the participants in the road 
transport supply chain, including consignors and consignees at the apex the chain, for the pay 
and safety of both employee and independent contractor drivers.  The tribunal is also specifically 
                                                            
5  Quinlan, above n 4. 
6 The Heavy Vehicle National Law Act 2012 was passed by the Queensland Parliament in 2012, and 
amended in 2013. Queensland also developed four Heavy Vehicle National Regulations. The amended 
Heavy Vehicle National Law, and the regulations were adopted by the Australian Capital Territory, New 
South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria, and came into operation in all six jurisdictions on 
10 February 2014. The Northern Territory and Western Australia have yet to implement the Heavy Vehicle 
National Law and regulations. 
7  https://www.nhvr.gov.au/safety-accreditation-compliance/chain-of-responsibility. See, for example, 
Heavy Vehicle National Law 2012 ss 202-3. 
8 See Industrial Relations Act 1996 (NSW), Chapter 6. 
9 Michael Rawling and Sarah Kaine, ‘Regulating Supply Chains to Provide a Safe Rate for Road Transport 
Workers (2012) 25 Australian Journal of Labour Law 237, 249. 
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empowered to make enforceable orders to reduce or remove remuneration related incentives and 
pressures that contribute to unsafe work practices in the road transport industry.  It can also 
approve road transport collective agreements for contractor drivers and deal with disputes 
between road transport industry participants.  
Under the Act the tribunal must, in consultation with industry,10 prepare and publish an annual 
work program.11 The tribunal began its operations on 1 July 2012, and soon thereafter it 
conducted a series of consultations with the road transport industry. Interested persons were 
invited to make submissions on the matters the tribunal should identify and prioritise in its 
annual work program. The tribunal then published its first annual work program in December 
2012, in which it would inquire into, and consider making orders covering, the retail, livestock, 
bulk grain sector, interstate and intrastate long distance sectors of the road transport industries. 
The first order of the tribunal covered the retail and long distance sector. The process began in 
December 2012 and culminated in an order made in December 2013. This order is examined in 
detail in this article. The tribunal conducted further consultations on its second annual work 
program, which it published in December 2013. According to the second work program, the 
tribunal would inquire into the cash-in-transit sector, the long distance sector and the sector 
pertaining to transportation of materials or goods destined for sale or hire in supermarket chains. 
In addition, the tribunal has held conferences (initially arising out of the first annual work 
program) concerning quantum of rates and cost recovery for contractor drivers. These matters 
were not determined by the tribunal’s first order and a separate order covering these matters had 
not been made at the time of writing this article. Finally, under the Act the tribunal can deal with 
disputes about remuneration and related conditions.12 In 2014 it dealt with a dispute concerning 
the sector of the road transport industry which transports oil, fuel and gas. 
This article analyses the proceedings in the retail and long distance sector leading to the making 
of the tribunal’s first order regulating road transport supply chains – the Road Transport and 
Distribution and Long Distance Operations Road Safety Remuneration Order 2014. These proceedings and 
order are particularly significant because this is the first time that any Australian court or tribunal 
has considered the extent of road transport industry clients’ obligations for the pay and safety of 
road transport drivers.  Indeed, mandatory, industrial obligations have rarely been imposed in 
any industry on business controllers who are removed from direct relations with workers due to 
supply chain outsourcing.  The only other industry in which firms (‘business controllers’) at the 
top of supply chains have mandatory obligations towards the workers throughout their supply 
chains is the textile, clothing and footwear industry, where mandatory retailer codes are currently 
in place in New South Wales and South Australia.13  
                                                            
10 Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) s 18(3).  
11 Ibid s 18.  
12 See Ibid s 40. 
13 For detailed analyses of these provisions, see Igor Nossar, Richard Johnstone, Anna Macklin and 
Michael Rawling, ‘Protective Legal Regulation for Home Based Workers in the Australian Textile, 
Clothing and Footwear Industry’ (2015) 57 Journal of Industrial Relations, in press; Michael Rawling, ‘Cross-
Jurisdictional and Other Implications of Mandatory Clothing Retailer Obligations’ (2014) 27 Australian 
Journal of Labour Law 191. 
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The article particularly addresses whether, and the degree to which, the tribunal has been willing 
to exercise its explicit power to impose mandatory and enforceable obligations on clients (which, 
in this article, refers to consignors and consignees) such as large supermarket chains at the apex 
of road transport supply chains.  It examines the substance and extent of those obligations 
imposed on clients by the tribunal, and assesses the extent to which the tribunal has exercised 
the full range of powers vested in it by the Act.  
The article begins with an examination of the economic and industrial factors in the road 
transport industry — and in particular the rising influence of road freight clients — which 
necessitate the regulation of entire road transport supply chains to address the issues of low pay 
and poor health and safety in the industry. It then outlines how the Act clearly empowers the 
tribunal to impose substantive economic obligations on parties throughout the supply chain, 
including the clients at the top of the chain. The remainder of the article analyses the tribunal’s 
first retail and long distance sector matter. The focus of this analysis is on whether and how the 
parties’ submissions, and the tribunal’s deliberations, considered the issue of imposing 
obligations on all supply chain participants, including upon clients at the top, for the pay and 
safety of drivers. It also examines the subsequent orders made by the tribunal. 
While we consider the tribunal clearly to be a very important initiative to regulate supply chains 
in the road freight industry, we argue that its first retail and long distance order does not fully 
address commercial pressures emanating from the top of the supply chain and which (as we 
know from the literature) are a contributing factor to poor health and safety outcomes for road 
transport drivers. While we acknowledge the significant political pressures on the tribunal, and 
the pressures from large economic interests, we argue that the health and safety issues facing 
truck drivers will only be adequately addressed if the tribunal fully implements the objectives of 
the Act by placing substantive economic obligations concerning driver pay and conditions upon 
all participants in the supply chain, including clients at the top of the chain. 
The literature has identified an Australian model of supply chain regulation initially and 
comprehensively applied in the textile clothing and footwear sector and more recently adapted to 
partially apply to the road transport sector.14 This model includes provisions (i) creating rights of 
recovery, buttressed by rebuttable presumptions, enabling workers to claim for unpaid wages 
against virtually any party in the contracting chain (who can then seek redress from the person 
actually liable); (ii) importing into retailer contracts compulsory, standardised, enforceable 
provisions informing retailers where and under what conditions workers are working; and (iii) 
enabling regulators, including unions, to access this information and to enforce fair working 
                                                            
14 See Nossar Johnstone, Macklin and Rawling, above n 14; Igor Nossar, Richard Johnstone and Michael 
Quinlan, ‘Regulating Supply Chains to Address the Occupational Health and Safety Problems Associated 
with Precarious Employment: The Case of Home-Based Clothing Workers in Australia’ (2004) 17 
Australian Journal of Labour Law 137; Michael Rawling, ‘A Generic Model of Regulating Supply Chain 
Outsourcing’ in Chris Arup, Peter Gahan, John Howe, Richard Johnstone, Richard Mitchell and Anthony 
O’Donnell (eds), Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation: Essays on the Construction, Constitution and 
Regulation of Labour Markets and Work Relationships (Federation Press, 2006) 520; Igor Nossar, ‘The Scope 
for Appropriate Cross-Jurisdictional Regulation of International Contract Networks (Such as Supply 
Chains): Recent Developments in Australia and Their Supra-National Implications’ Business Outsourcing 
and Restructuring Regulatory Research Network Working Paper No 1, 2007 at 
http://www.borrrn.org/attachments/003_Nossar%20ILO%20FINAL%20DRAFT%20.pdf. 
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conditions. The analysis in this article demonstrates that the tribunal, in its first order, appears to 
be reluctant to accept and institutionalise this model, at least at this point in time. 
  
II. THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL FACTORS LEADING TO THE NEED FOR 
SUBSTANTIVE, MANDATORY SUPPLY CHAIN OBLIGATIONS 
Both the commercial and industrial contexts in the road transport industry have changed 
dramatically in the past 40 years.  Until the 1970s there were few, if any, pressures on major 
transport companies to outsource driving tasks, and most directly engaged drivers, and had the 
financial capacity to provide for adequate work terms and conditions for drivers.15 There was 
little scope to evade statutory work entitlements. Under the legislated industrial system of 
conciliation and arbitration, awards set market rates and conditions reaching across an entire 
industry.  These industry-wide standards largely undermined any attempts of road transport 
industry clients to create supply chains to circumvent, undercut or avoid these standard terms 
and conditions because, at that time, all road transport employers in the same sector were 
required to provide the same market terms and conditions to their employees. In short, transport 
industry clients were not significantly pressured, and had little opportunity, to seek out road 
transport operators who could offer them cheaper transport services by providing lower terms 
and conditions to their employees than those established in centrally set industry standards. A 
significant proportion of retailers and other industry clients directly engaged, as principal 
employers, their own fleets of trucks and paid their employee drivers good wages and conditions 
for employees as set out in awards and agreements.  
Since the 1970s the dynamics of the road freight transport industry have changed, and retailers 
and other industry clients have realised that they can achieve considerable cost-savings by 
contracting out road transport work, and at the same time maintaining influence over the 
parameters of that work.16 Two interrelated commercial changes have transformed the Australian 
road transport industry and increased the pressure to outsource driving work through supply 
chains: the fragmentation of work17 and a consolidation of the influence of road transport clients 
─ consignors and consignees ─ at the top of the road transport supply chain. From the 1980s, 
an increasing amount of work previously undertaken by direct employees of major road 
transport industry employers has fragmented to become work contracted to an increasing 
number of smaller transport operators, who, in turn, engage owner-drivers, largely operating 
outside the federal system of industrial awards.  This has been accompanied by a considerable 
                                                            
15 Interview with union official. 
16 Witness statement of Michael Kaine, In the matter of Road Safety Remuneration Order – Application 
by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1) 12 August 
2013, 9.  
17 On work fragmentation generally, see Mick Marchington, Damian Grimshaw, Jill Rubery and Hugh 
Wilmott (eds), Fragmenting Work: Blurring Organizational Boundaries and Disordering Heirarchies (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005); Richard Johnstone, Shae McCrystal, Igor Nossar, Michael Quinlan, 
Michael Rawling and Joellen Riley, Beyond Employment: the Legal Regulation of Work Relationships (Federation 
Press, Sydney, 2012); Judy Fudge, Shae Mcrystal and Kamala Sankaran (eds), Challenging the Legal Boundaries 
of Work Regulation (Hart, Oxford, 2012); Katherine V W Stone, and Harry Arthurs (eds), Rethinking 
Workplace Regulation: Beyond the Standard Contract of Employment (Russell Sage, New York, 2013). 
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rise in the power and influence of road transport industry clients, including a duopoly of food 
and grocery retailers with substantial road transportation requirements.18   
These changes in the Australian road transport industry have occurred within broader 
developments world-wide, in which large 20th century integrated firms — which previously 
engaged large numbers of employees to perform work in-house — have restructured to 
outsource work to other firms which indirectly (through arrangements such as labour hire and 
sub-contracting) and cost-effectively provide labour back to those large firms.19 As a result of 
these developments, and mergers and takeovers of other business entities in the same industry, 
many large and powerful corporate structures now effectively control a network or supply chain 
of suppliers, distributors and other businesses providing labour.20  Consistent with this global 
trend, Australian road transport industry clients now exercise significant bargaining power across 
all of their supply chains including those in the road transport industry. Conversely, all road 
transport companies, including the major road transport employers, have experienced a 
significant dilution of their bargaining power relative to many of their clients.21 In their 
negotiations with large and powerful clients, the road transport companies frequently have to 
accept the price set by the client for the cost of road transport services, and a range of client 
requirements in freight contracts, including transportation schedules, and specifications for the 
loading and unloading of goods transported.22   
These adverse effects on Australian road transport operators have been exacerbated by the 
decentralisation of the industrial relations system, initiated by the Keating Labor government in 
1993, and resulting in an enterprise bargaining system in which transport operators bargain at an 
enterprise, rather than industry, level for market rates above a safety net of minimum standards. 
As a result of these developments, in the road freight market, major road transport employers 
now have to compete with smaller road transport operators with lower labour costs and inferior 
health and safety standards. Setting market rates at an enterprise, rather than industry, level 
enables smaller operators to offer their frequently non-unionised workforces the minimum safety 
net rates for employees and/or a low per kilometre rate to owner drivers. The major transport 
employers who have entered into registered enterprise agreements have found it increasingly 
difficult to negotiate with influential clients because those clients can avoid the use of the major 
transport operators altogether by engaging smaller, alternative operators that are not bound by 
the same enterprise agreement market rates and conditions.23 The rise of road transport industry 
client power has placed significant pressure on the entire Australian road transport industry, 
including major transport operators, which have struggled to make a profit if they offer fair pay 
                                                            
18 Rawling and Kaine, above n 10 at 24. 
19 Michael Rawling and John Howe, 'The Regulation of Supply Chains: An Australian Contribution to 
Cross-National Legal Learning' in Katherine V W Stone, and Harry Arthurs (eds) Rethinking Workplace 
Regulation: Beyond the Standard Contract of Employment (Russell Sage, New York, 2013) 233, 234; David Weil, 
‘Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces: The US Experience (2011) 22 Economic and Labour 
Relations Review 33; David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can 
be Done to Improve It, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2014) especially ch 3.  
20 See Jennifer Bair, ‘Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward' (2005) 9 
Competition and Change 153.  
21 See Quinlan, above n 1, 180. 
22 Ibid, 20; Quinlan and Wright, above n 3, 50. 
23 Interview with union official. 
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and conditions to their road transport workers under enterprise agreements while receiving the 
inferior terms (including monetary payments) set by clients in the freight contracts with those 
major transport operators. In order to meet the stringent cost requirements of large clients, 
major transport operators, particularly those contracting with large retail clients, have, instead of 
employing their own drivers at rates set by their enterprise agreement, further contracted out 
road transport work to road transport companies that offer inferior safety standards, pay and 
conditions.24  
As a consequence of these three developments – the fragmentation of work, the rise in the 
power of the retailers and the decentralisation of the industrial relations system – commercial 
pressures driven down the supply chain by powerful road transport clients, resulting in cost 
reductions and unrealistic delivery timetables, have led to the extensive use of owner-drivers at 
low and arguably often unsustainable rates, and to lower levels of compliance with basic pay and 
conditions standards for employees.25 Supply chain pressures and the competitive nature of the 
industry have produced freight rates and pay rates so low that some transport providers and 
owner-drivers cut corners on essential truck maintenance, creating unsafe conditions for drivers 
and the public on the road.26 This link between economic pressures in the industry and poor 
safety outcomes has been substantiated by academic research27 and government commissioned 
reports.28  It is also consistent with a growing body of research on the adverse effects of supply 
chain outsourcing for workers working at the bottom of supply chains more generally.29  This 
research suggests that without regulatory measures to counter these adverse effects of the three 
developments described in this section and to impose mandatory supply chain obligations upon 
large clients ensuring decent pay and the safety of road transport drivers, work standards and 
health and safety conditions in the road transport industry will remain inadequate. 
III. STATUTORY POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL TO REGULATE ALL PARTICIPANTS 
IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN, INCLUDING CONSIGNORS AND CONSIGNEES. 
                                                            
24 Quinlan and Wright, above n 3, 19;  
25 Ibid 50; Quinlan, above n 1, 21. 
26 Quinlan above n 1, 180; Quinlan and Wright above n 3, 16, 19, 26, 40.  
27 Ann Williamson et al, Driver Fatigue: A Survey of Long Distance Heavy Vehicle Drivers in Australia, National 
Road Transport Commission, Information Paper/CR 198, September 2001; David Hensher, and Helen 
Battellino ‘Long Distance Trucking: Why do Truckies Speed?’ (1990) 15 Papers for Australasian Transport 
Research Forum 537, 553; Michael Belzer The Economics of Safety: How Compensation Affects Commercial Motor 
Vehicle Driver Safety prepared for Safe Rates Summit, Canberra, November 2011; Daniel A Rodriguez, 
Felipe Targa and Michael Belzer ‘Pay Incentives and Truck Driver Safety: A Case Study’ (2006) 59 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 205. 
28 Quinlan above n 1; Quinlan and Wright above n 3; Department of Education, Employment and  
Workplace Relations Safe Rates Safe Roads Direction Paper Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2010, 15-
16. 
29 See, eg, David Walters and Phil James, ‘What Motivates Employers to Establish Preventive 
Management Arrangements within Supply Chains?’ (2011) 49 Safety Science 988 at 989; Phil James, Richard 
Johnstone, Michael Quinlan and David Walters ‘Regulating Supply Chains to Improve Health and Safety’ 
(2007) 36 Industrial Law Journal 163, 166–170; Chris Wright and John Lund, ‘Supply Chain Rationalization: 
Retailer Dominance and Labour Flexibility in the Australian Food and Grocery Industry’ (2003) 17 Work, 
Employment and Society 137, 142–151. 
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The above analysis, well documented in key government reports into the national road transport 
industry,30 suggests that what is required to ensure safe driving in the road freight industry is 
regulatory intervention that targets the root causes of low pay and poor health and safety in the 
road transport industry.  For regulation to be effective, it needs to address the economic 
pressures driven down the supply chain which induce road transport operators and drivers to 
engage in hazardous practices.  
The Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth), which, as we have noted in our introduction, 
established the road safety remuneration tribunal to address working conditions in the road 
transport industry,31 and empowers it to make orders to remove remuneration-related incentives, 
pressures and practices that contribute to unsafe work practices, was established to provide this 
very kind of effective regulation. The tribunal has the potential to establish this kind of supply 
chain regulation on an industry or sector basis, potentially addressing the pressures from road 
transport industry clients to circumvent enterprise level regulation.  
The regulatory powers of the tribunal can be applied nationally across all road transport sectors, 
including general road transport, distribution (including couriers and construction industry 
drivers), the cash-in-transit industry and the waste management industry.32 The key power vested 
in the tribunal is to make road safety remuneration orders which are consistent with the objects 
of the Act.33 The objects of the Act include: removing remuneration-related incentives, pressures 
and practices that contribute to unsafe work practices;34 developing and applying enforceable 
standards throughout the road transport supply chain to ensure the safety of road transport 
workers;35 and ensuring that hirers of road transport drivers and participants in the supply chain 
take responsibility for implementing and maintaining those standards.36 The Revised Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Road Safety Remuneration Bill 2012 states that the object of the Bill is to:  
promote safety and fairness in the road transport industry by doing such things as 
ensuring that the drivers do not have remuneration-related incentives to work in an 
unsafe manner and ensuring that all participants in the supply chain take responsibility for 
ensuring standards are maintained and commercial incentives and pressures and industry practices that 
contribute to unsafe work practices are removed.37 
A ‘participant’ in the supply chain is defined in section 9 of the Act. Consignors or consignees 
(of a thing in respect of which a road transport driver is providing road transport services)38 as 
well as intermediaries (that are party to a contract for the carriage of goods which concerns the 
transport of a thing in respect of which a road transport driver is providing road transport 
services)39 are captured by the definition of supply chain participant as long as they fall within the 
                                                            
30 Quinlan and Wright, above n 3, 61-62; Quinlan, above n 1. 
31 Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) ss 3, 79. 
32 Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) ss 6-7; Rawling and Kaine, above n 10, 252. 
33 Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) s 19(1). 
34 Ibid s 3(b).  
35 Ibid s 3(d). 
36 Ibid s 3(e). 
37 Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Road Safety Remuneration Bill 2012 cl 8, emphasis added. 
38 Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) ss 9(2)-(3). 
39 Ibid s 9(4). 
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broad range of legislative powers now available, in the Australian Constitution, to the 
Commonwealth Parliament under the corporations power (section 51(xx)),the trade and 
commerce power (section 51(i)), territories power (section 122) and power to regulate the 
Commonwealth public service (section 52). A supply chain participant is also defined to include 
a constitutional corporation which is an operator of premises that are used by a road transport 
driver to load or unload an average of at least five vehicles a day.40  
The tribunal is then explicitly empowered to impose on all participants in the supply chain ─ 
including consignors and consignees ─ requirements addressing the pay and safety of drivers at 
the foot of the supply chain.  Sub-section 27(3) of the Act specifies that a road safety 
remuneration order made by the tribunal can ‘impose requirements’ on “a participant in the 
supply chain in relation to a road transport driver to whom the order applies”.41 The Revised 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Road Safety Remuneration Bill 201242 explains that the Bill 
operates to impose responsibility on all parties in the supply chain for road transport services to 
ensure the objects of the Act is given effect to the fullest extent . . .’  
The tribunal has clear powers to address economic pressures emanating down the supply chain 
and the next section of this article examines whether the tribunal has fully used these powers in 
the first tribunal order. 
 
IV. THE TRIBUNAL’S FIRST ORDER. 
A. The Annual Work Program, Consultations and Draft Order 
The Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal began operation on 1 July 2012.  It published its first 
Annual Work Program in December 2012 after consultations with, and submissions from, 
interested persons.43 The tribunal received 14 initial written submissions from, unions, employer 
organisations and individuals, including Professor Michael Quinlan. There were then four further 
submissions replying to initial submissions by unions and employer organisations and six 
submissions on a draft annual work program from individuals and employer organisations. The 
Program identified the retail, livestock, bulk grain, interstate and intrastate long distance sectors 
of the road transport industry as sectors that the tribunal proposed to inquire into with a view to 
making a road safety remuneration order.44 Before the tribunal can make an order, it is required 
to prepare, and consult on, a draft order.45 In order to consult with interested parties, the tribunal 
made a series of public visits to transport and logistics sites, and sought and received written 
submissions,46 including proposed orders.47  
                                                            
40 Ibid s 9(6). 
41 See also Jennifer Acton, ‘Complementary Jurisdictions: the Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal and 
Occupational Health and Safety Laws’, Address to the ACTU OHS/Workers’ Compensation Conference, 
Sydney, 6 September 2012, 3. 
42 Cl 27. 
43 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Decision [2013] RSRTFB 7 (17 December 2013) para 13. 
44 Re Annual Work Program [2012] RSRTFB 3 (10 December 2012) 
45 Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) s 22. 
46 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Statement [2013] RSRTFB 3, (12 July 2013). 
47 See Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Decision [2013] RSRTFB 7 (17 December 2013) para 27. 
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The TWU submitted draft orders, which at least to some extent, sought to implement the 
Australian model of supply chain regulation by proposing substantive obligations for consignors 
and consignees at the apex of the road transport supply chain. These proposed obligations 
included a requirement that consignors and consignees make payment on demand to drivers for 
any unpaid amount owed to the driver by his or her employer or hirer48 and a requirement that 
consignors and consignees ensure compliance with safe driving plans49 — a safe work method 
statement made before driving work commences and designed to address the link between pay 
and safety.50 Safe driving plans are discussed further below.  
The Australian National Retailers Association (‘ANRA’) submitted that all of these proposed 
substantive obligations on consignors and consignees were inappropriate.51  The Australian 
Industry Group urged the tribunal to ‘adopt a cautious approach’ when considering the scope of 
any draft order,52 strongly opposed the right of drivers to recover unpaid amounts from 
consignors and consignees and submitted that requirements upon consignors and consignees for 
safe driving plans would unnecessarily duplicate obligations.53  Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty 
Ltd (Coles), a major consignor and consignee, questioned the practicality and utility of imposing 
obligations regarding safe driving plans on consignors and consignees.54 
In July 2013 the tribunal issued a draft order covering road transport drivers who provide road 
transport services involving retail goods, livestock, bulk grain or long distance travel.55  Despite 
the tribunal’s clear mandate noted above, to regulate all the parties in the supply chain, the major 
obligations proposed in the tribunal’s draft order were imposed only on direct employers and 
hirers who are parties to a road transport contract with a driver.  Under the draft order an 
employer or hirer of a driver would have had to provide the driver with a written contract prior 
to commencing work, specifying matters including the wage (or contract driver pay rate), a 
mechanism for the annual review of driver rates, any guaranteed minimum hours of work, and 
the period of the contract, period of notice of termination or payment in lieu of notice.56 Despite 
the evidence discussed earlier in this article that large commercial interests at the apex of the 
supply chain wield considerable influence over the road transport supply chain, the draft order 
proposed to impose obligations on the party with the least bargaining power in the entire chain – 
the driver.  In particular, the draft order specified that the written contract had to include a 
clause that effectively required drivers to provide an annual driver history report from the 
                                                            
48 Transport Workers Union, ‘Draft Road Safety Remuneration (Retail Sector) Order’, Submission in Re 
Annual Work Program [2012] RSRTFB 3, 4 March 2013, cl 5. 
49 Ibid cl 13. 
50 Rawling and Kaine, above n 10, 249. 
51 Australian National Retailers Association, Response to TWU application for Road Safety Remuneration 
Orders, Submission in Re Annual Work Program [2012] RSRTFB 3, April 2013, para 3.12; para 3.48.  
52 Australian Industry Group ‘Submission Regarding the Potential Preparation of Draft Road Safety 
Remuneration Orders’ Submission in Re Annual Work Program [2012] RSRTFB 3, 8 July 2013 para 20. 
53 Australian Industry Group ‘Submission in Response to Road Safety Remuneration Orders Proposed by 
Various Parties’ Submission in Re Annual Work Program [2012] RSRTFB 3, 22 April 2013, p 32; p 48. 
54 Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd ‘Submission to Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal’ submission 
in Re Annual Work Program [2012] RSRTFB 3, 22 April 2013, p 3. 
55 See Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Draft Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations 
Road Safety Remuneration Order 2013, (12 July 2013) cl 4. 
56 Ibid cl 7. 
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relevant state or territory licencing authority.57 This requirement imposed on drivers was retained 
in the final, binding order.58 
Under the tribunal’s draft order each employer or hirer was required to prepare a written safe 
driving plan for each road transport driver they engaged to perform long distance haulage 
services.59 Safe driving plans are not a new regulatory instrument – they were previously required, 
in the form of driver fatigue management plans, for entire supply chains covered by the 
Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Long Distance Truck Driver Fatigue) Regulation 
2005 (NSW) noted above  and for both employee and contractor drivers under the NSW mutual 
responsibility award and mutual responsibility contract determination.60  Under the tribunal’s 
draft order the proposed safe driving plan would have had to state: the period covered by the 
safe driving plan; pick -up and delivery addresses; the applicable industrial instruments; the 
applicable hourly or per kilometre pay rate; a draft travel plan including distance to be travelled at 
any one time and when breaks are to be taken; and provisions allowing the driver to take 
additional rest breaks if they are necessary to manage fatigue and ensure the safe completion of 
the road transport services. It would also have to require the driver to record actual timeframes 
and distances travelled as evidenced by odometer readings.61  These are similar matters to those 
required in the safe driving plans under the mutual responsibility award and contract 
determination.62 The mutual responsibility award and contract determination did, however, on 
one matter create a stronger link between pay and safety than the draft order: it stated that the 
safe driving plan had to state the system by which the effect of the method of remuneration on driver fatigue 
may be monitored and measured. The award and determination also required an additional 
matter to be identified in safe driving plans: the means by which the number of hours performed 
by drivers was to be limited in order to prevent excessive hours being worked. By way of 
contrast, the tribunal’s draft order included one matter not found in a safe driving plan in the 
award and determination: the driver was required to record actual timeframes and distances 
travelled. 
 
                                                            
57 Ibid cl 7(h). 
58 See Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations Road 
Safety Remuneration Order 2014 PR350280 (17 December 2013), cl 7.2(j). 
59 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Draft Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations Road 
Safety Remuneration Order 2013, (12 July 2013) cl 11.1, cl 11.2. 
60 Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales Transport Industry – Mutual Responsibility for Road 
Safety (State) Award (2006); Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales Mutual Responsibility for 
Road Safety (State) Contract Determination (2006). Under these mutual responsibility instruments the 
responsibility for the safe driving plans is or was imposed upon all parties in the road transport supply 
chain except, due to jurisdictional limitations, consignors and consignees who do not directly engage road 
transport workers: Rawling and Kaine, above n 10, p 249 
61 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Draft Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations Road 
Safety Remuneration Order 2013, (12 July 2013) cl 11.8. 
62 See Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales Transport Industry – Mutual Responsibility for 
Road Safety (State) Award (2006) cl 3.2; Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales Mutual 
Responsibility for Road Safety (State) Contract Determination (2006) cl 3.2. 
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Aside from one new substantive responsibility of participants in the supply chain not to take 
adverse action against a driver,63 the tribunal’s draft order imposed only a few, arguably weak, 
responsibilities on parties in the top and middle of the supply chain.  Perhaps the most 
significant proposed draft order obligation was for participants throughout the supply chain, 
including consignors and consignees, to consult with employers and hirers and to take 
reasonable steps, through their ‘contractual arrangements and otherwise, to satisfy themselves that 
the road transport services covered by a safe driving plan can be performed in accordance with 
the safe driving plan.’64 This would have imposed a pro-active obligation on consignors and 
consignees to take measures to ensure compliance with safe driving plans. As we discuss later in 
this article, this proposed obligation was omitted from the final, enforceable order.  
The tribunal’s draft order also included some other, weaker, provisions involving participants in 
the supply chain in the process of implementing safe driving plans. It required an employer or 
hirer, when preparing and implementing a safe driving plan, to consult other participants, 
including consignors and consignees, in the supply chain.65 Further, a participant in the supply 
chain would be required to witness safe driving plans.66 
Clause 7.4 of the draft order specified that a participant in the supply chain ‘must take reasonable 
steps to ensure that any contract for the provision of a road transport service relevant to them is 
consistent with the requirements’ of the order. It is difficult to work out whether or not this 
provision would have added any substantial obligation upon participants in the supply chain over 
and above obligations imposed upon them elsewhere in the draft order.  One broad, beneficial 
reading of the clause is that this sub-clause 7.4 requirement on a supply chain participant to take 
reasonable steps applies to all of the obligations of all of the parties subject to the order. A more likely, 
but narrower, reading is that the requirement in sub-clause 7.4 would only have been triggered by 
another requirement upon a supply chain participant elsewhere in the order. If this narrow 
reading is preferred, sub-clause 7.4 appears not to add anything to a participant’s obligations 
regarding safe driving plans.  If this is the correct view, aside from the requirement not to take 
adverse action against a driver, the main requirement on participants in the supply chain under 
the draft order was to ensure compliance with safe driving plans, including through contractual 
arrangements. In any case, it is clear that sub-clause 7.4 of the draft order proposed a weak 
obligation upon consignors and consignees only to include or exclude terms in their contract, 
rather than a stronger obligation actually to take action to ensure adequate pay and safe driving 
conditions for drivers in their supply chains. 
 
B. The Interested Parties’ Submissions and Evidence Presented to the Tribunal 
                                                            
63 See Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Draft Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations 
Road Safety Remuneration Order 2013, (12 July 2013) cl 6. This responsibility was maintained in the final 
order and is discussed below in this article. 
64 Ibid cl 11.5. 
65 Ibid cl 11.4. 
66 Ibid cl 11.6; cl 11.8(k). 
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The Act requires the tribunal to allow affected persons to comment and make submissions on a 
draft order.67 Professor Michael Quinlan, a key expert on the connection between economic 
structures and work health and safety conditions in the road transport industry and the author of 
two major reports on the road transport industry,68 provided a written statement to the tribunal 
soon after the draft order was issued. Professor Quinlan’s statement, which was made available 
on the tribunal’s website, provides perhaps the clearest and most authoritative recent account of 
the evidence supporting the imposition of substantive obligations on major consignors and 
consignees in order to improve health and safety in the road transport industry. The statement 
highlighted ‘the power exercised by those at the top of the transport supply chain’ and ‘how an 
elaborate subcontracting network was used … to disguise the role played by clients.’69 It argued 
that subcontracting: 
 enabled clients … to set conditions relating to the transport of goods (such as 
timeliness, the state of the produce on arrival etc) but remain agnostic about the 
work practices and working conditions required to secure this for the price paid. 
Clients would claim that they neither knew, nor did they have influence over, such 
arrangements (even though the conditions they set on other aspects of transport 
contract just mentioned belied this).70 
According to Professor Quinlan, arrangements in which commercial power is exercised at the top 
of the transport supply chain to safeguard clients’ interests are longstanding. They existed before 
he conducted his 2001 inquiry and the ‘intensity of client pressure . . . to reduce costs has grown 
over the past 20 years’.71 Professor Quinlan’s point was reinforced during the Road Safety 
Remuneration Tribunal proceedings, when, during cross-examination, a general manager of 
transport for Coles revealed that his Key Performance Indicators included reducing Coles’ 
transport costs by 5% in a year.72  
Professor Quinlan recommended that instruments such as safe driving plans in the tribunal’s 
order ‘need to address … the problem of complex webs of subcontracting and clients often in a 
position to exert considerable influence on the conditions under which drivers work …’73 
The admission of Professor Quinlan’s witness statement into evidence in circumstances where he 
would not be available for cross-examination was opposed by the major retail clients of the road 
                                                            
67 Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) s24; Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Decision [2013] RSRTFB 
7 (17 December 2013) para 30. 
68 Quinlan, above n 1; Quinlan and Wright, above n 3. 
69 Witness statement of Professor Michael Quinlan, in the matter of Road Safety Remuneration Order – 
Application by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 
2013/1)(30 July 2013) para 26. 
70 Ibid para 31. 
71 Ibid para 48, para 49. 
72 See Transcript of Proceedings Road Safety Remuneration Order – Application by Transport Workers Union of 
Australia, (Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal, RSRT 2013/1, 13 August 2013) para 1924-1930. 
73 Witness statement of Professor Michael Quinlan, in the matter of Transport Workers Union of 
Australia, Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1) (30 July 2013) para 40. 
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transport industry, major transport companies and employer peak associations. The tribunal 
agreed with these submissions, ‘given the reasons for opposition by other interested persons.’74 
Although Professor Quinlan’s evidence was not admitted, his governmental inquiry reports in 
200175 and with Wright in 2008,76 were presented to, and considered by, the tribunal. Indeed, the 
tribunal specifically quoted the conclusion of the Quinlan report in 2001 that customer and 
consignor requirements on price, schedules, loading/unloading and freight contracts generally 
encourage unsustainable freight rates and dangerous work practices.77 The tribunal also quoted 
the finding by Quinlan and Wright in 2008 that the ‘overwhelming weight of evidence indicates 
that commercial/industrial practices affecting road transport play a direct and significant role in 
causing hazardous practices.’78  
The TWU submitted that the tribunal had the means to regulate the entire road transport supply 
chain and to ensure that the power of clients is countered by a safe rates system.79 The TWU, 
however, submitted that the tribunal’s draft order did not adequately deal with the client 
pressures pushed down the road transport supply chain, and that the draft order’s supply chain 
responsibility clause 7.4 would not make real improvements to levels of safety in the industry. It 
argued that the clause 7.4 obligation in the draft order would be satisfied simply if a contract 
contains the requisite provision, even if it did not reflect the reality of the circumstances in which 
driving was carried out. According to the TWU, clause 7.4 would not achieve anything, because it 
did not make clients with the ultimate power to determine rates responsible for ensuring that 
appropriate payments were made to drivers.80 
The TWU suggested that the safe driving plan provision in clause 11 of the draft order did not 
adequately make consignors and consignees responsible for ensuring that their subcontractors 
prepare safe driving plans and nor did it oblige consignors and consignees to monitor compliance 
with safe driving plans.81 It submitted that clients must be compelled to take pro-active steps to 
monitor compliance with safe driving plans, and to take action where they know of non-
compliance with safe driving plans. According to the TWU, if these obligations were not part of 
the safe driving plans then safe driving plans might become ‘an additional layer of industry 
regulation without addressing the root cause of the industry’s safety issues.’82 
The TWU submitted that for the draft order not to require effective steps to deal with the 
economic forces imposed by clients on the supply chain parties in the road transport industry 
would be contrary to the intent of the legislation and the significant body of evidence 
                                                            
74 Annual Work Program – Decision [2013] RSRTFB 11 (16 October 2013) para 4. 
75 Quinlan, above n 1. 
76 Quinlan and Wright, above n 3. 
77 Road Safety Remuneration Order - Decision [2013] RSRTFB 7 para 64. 
78 Cited in ibid, para 75. 
79 Transport Workers Union of Australia ‘Outline of Submissions for the TWU’ submission in Road 
Safety Remuneration Order – Application by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety 
Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1)(1 August 2013) para 4. 
80 Ibid para 22. 
81 Ibid para 66, para 73. 
82 Ibid para 75. 
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underpinning the legislative intent.83It further submitted that if the tribunal only dealt with the 
symptoms of safety issues in the road transport industry instead of the economic pressures 
imposed by clients, it may in fact make the industry worse off84 because the draft order’s failure 
to address supply chain pressures would put more regulation on drivers and transport companies 
without addressing client power and influence.85  
(a) Client Argument and Response 
The response of the large retailer clients to the argument that they should have responsibility for 
the working conditions of drivers in their supply chains was to deny they have the control over 
the supply chains. This response echoes the strategy of effective business controllers in industries 
like textiles, clothing and footwear, where retailers have resisted mandatory regulation by 
asserting that they do not control the conditions under which goods are manufactured.86  
In particular, Coles put forward evidence to distinguish their role in receiving inbound freight 
from their role in sending outbound freight. It argued that inbound freight concerns the 
movement of freight from a supplier or manufacturer to a Coles distribution centre.87 In most 
cases of inbound freight (about 70%) the manufacturer or supplier is the consignor, and either 
themselves or using a transport company transports the freight to Coles as the consignee; 30% of 
the inbound freight movement is organised by Coles Collect in a direct relationship with the 
supplier consignor and delivered to Coles as consignee.88  Coles then argued that outbound 
freight is the movement of freight from a Coles distribution centre to another Coles distribution 
centre or to Coles’ stores.89 Here Coles argued that they were consignor in 60% of outbound 
freight movements, and a third party logistics provider was consignor for the remaining 40% of 
the outbound freight movements.90 Coles stated that approximately 80% of Coles costs spent on 
road freight transport was on outbound freight.91  
Coles then argued that there was a distinction between the control it had as a consignor, and the 
control it had as a consignee. It suggested that when it was a consignor only it had the requisite 
control to regulate the supply chain — it was ‘readily able to impose contractual obligations on 
the primary freight provider and also ensure that the primary freight provider in turn places 
certain contractual obligations on a subcontractor …’92 Coles, however, denied it had the 
requisite control over any supply chain in which it was the consignee, in which case it argued that 
it was purely receiving the freight, and that it had ‘no role or oversight in respect of the freight 
                                                            
83 Ibid para 11. 
84 Ibid para 5. 
85 Ibid para 11, p3. 
86  In the clothing industry there is evidence of control wielded by major retailers over the conditions of 
clothing manufacture: see Nossar, Johnstone, Macklin and Rawling, above n 14. 
87 Witness statement of Craig Wickham in the matter of Road Safety Remuneration Order – Application 
by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1) 1 August 
2013, p 2. 
88 Ibid p 2. 
89 Ibid p 2. 
90 Ibid pp 2-3. 
91 Ibid p 3. 
92 Ibid p 4. 
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movement.’ 93 The ANRA made a similar statement that obligations should not be imposed on 
retailers where the retailer was a consignee of inbound freight.94 
Although this was not explicitly stated by Coles, the argument that their only role with inbound 
freight was receiving freight and not in any way overseeing or controlling the process presumably 
excluded the inbound freight movements where which were organised by Coles Collect — here 
Coles would have oversight over the supply chain as the freight organiser, even though the 
freight originated with the supplier.  
Coles’ evidence that it had no oversight of inbound freight as consignee was, however, 
contradicted by some of Coles’ other evidence, which indicated that Coles had direct contact 
with, and indeed did exercise some influence over, drivers delivering supplier freight. For 
example, it stated that Coles’ distribution centre employees were trained to challenge any drivers 
about a range of matters including fatigue and situations in which the driver was delayed in 
unloading. ‘Coles may . . . require drivers to complete a declaration form which requires the 
driver to declare key facts regarding the condition of the vehicle, the load and the driver’s 
condition.’95 Further, during our own discussions with union officials,96 an official suggested, in 
relation to inbound freight, that even though large retailers do not have a direct contract with the 
transport operator, the retailers know when the freight arrives and they indicate to the supplying 
party or parties when they want the freight to arrive. Presumably such delivery matters are in their 
contract with the supplier.97 Coles also stated that it had undertaken audits of its contract partners 
to ensure its partners impose a consistent chain of responsibility regime across their networks.98 
This indicates that, even when it is receiving road freight, Coles is able to impose requirements 
on its contract partners which relate to the activities throughout the supply chain.99 
Coles opposed the draft order clause requiring supply chain participants to consult over the safe 
driving plan and to take reasonable steps to satisfy themselves that the road transport services 
covered by the plan can be performed in accordance with the plan,100 arguing that it was 
                                                            
93 Ibid p 4. 
94 Australian National Retailers Association ‘Comments on Submissions to the Road Safety Remuneration 
Tribunal on its Draft Order of July 2013, submission in Road Safety Remuneration Order – Application 
by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1) 8 August 
2013 p 13. 
95 Witness Statement of David Vaughan in the matter of Road Safety Remuneration Order – Application 
by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1) 1 August 
2013, para 15. 
96 Australian Research Council funded project, Australian Supply Chain Regulation: Practical Operation and Regulatory 
Effectiveness, DP120103162. 
97 Interview with union official. 
98 Witness Statement of David Vaughan in the matter of Road Safety Remuneration Order – Application 
by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1) 1 August 
2013, para 20. 
99 Transport Workers Union of Australia, ‘Outline of Submissions for the TWU in Reply’ submission in 
Road Safety Remuneration Order – Application by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety 
Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1) 8 August 2013 p 10. 
100 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Draft Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations 
Road Safety Remuneration Order 2013, (12 July 2013), cl 11.5. 
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unnecessary, unreasonable or unduly burdensome given the sheer volume of safe driving plans 
this requirement would cover.101 
(b) TWU amendments to draft order 
In response to these retailer submissions, the TWU submitted that consignors and consignees 
had a clear capacity to intervene in contracts throughout their supply chains. The entire rationale 
for the Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 was to address the economic pressures imposed by 
powerful parties such as the retail giants on road transport supply chains which led to low pay 
and poor safety in the road transport industry. Therefore the TWU argued that the retailer 
submissions could not be accepted.102  
The TWU proposed amendments to the tribunal’s draft order that, if accepted, would have 
imposed a suite of obligations designed to ensure that clients with the most economic power in 
the supply chain have the responsibility for ensuring that safe rates and conditions flow to all 
drivers performing the work within those supply chains.103  In particular, the TWU amendments 
to the draft order:  
 placed a stronger obligation on clients to take action to ensure compliance with industrial 
obligations throughout their supply chains;  
 placed an obligation on clients to ensure freight is carted in compliance with safe driving 
plans;  
 provided for a right of drivers to recover unpaid money owed to them for hauling freight 
against any relevant participant in the supply chain, including retail clients;  
 placed an obligation on retail clients to ensure that payments they make for provision of 
road transport services were sufficient to enable drivers who provided those services to 
be paid in accordance with applicable industrial instruments; and  
 imposed record keeping requirements on participants in the supply chain, including retail 
clients.104 
More specifically, the first TWU amendment outlined above was designed pro-actively to address 
the commercial pressures passed down the road transport supply chain by clearly requiring all 
supply chain participants, including retail consignors and consignees, to ensure that all transport 
work conducted pursuant to a freight contract to which they are a party is carried out in 
compliance with the applicable safe driving plan, the eventual order of the tribunal and any 
                                                            
101 Witness statement of Craig Wickham in the matter of Road Safety Remuneration Order – Application 
by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1) 1 august 
2013, paras 24-28. 
102 Transport Workers Union of Australia ‘Outline of Submissions for the TWU in Reply’ submission in 
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applicable award, agreement or other relevant industrial instrument.105 This first TWU 
amendment would have more effectively dealt with supply chain pressures because retail clients 
would have been required to take action —including termination of the transport operator’s 
contract with the client — if that transport operator breached any safe driving plan, the tribunal 
order or any applicable industrial instrument.106  This proposed clause might have induced retail 
clients to ensure the safe performance of work by compelling road transport operators to comply 
with their industrial obligations and safe driving plans.  The legal sanctioning of a power to 
terminate contracts is an important measure, not so much to encourage actual action to terminate 
(although it may need to be in certain instances), but more because the mere existence of the 
provision and the potential threat of termination would send an important message to transport 
operators that their compliance with industrial obligations would be a condition of receiving 
business from retail clients. 
The record-keeping obligations suggested by the TWU would have required retail clients, and 
other supply chain participants, to retain and make available to government and union regulators 
information — including safe driving plans — indicating the pay rates of drivers.107  Such record-
keeping measures — a key element in the emerging Australian supply chain regulatory model 
discussed above — were included to address the lack of transparency that has impeded the 
detection and eradication of unsafe practices in the road transport industry.108 Aside from the fact 
that these measures would be a principal method of a supply chain participant demonstrating 
their own compliance, these transparency measures would have had the effect of making clear to 
all parties that retailer clients have information about matters such as what pay drivers are 
receiving. This would potentially circumvent an argument by a supply chain participant that they 
do not have the requisite knowledge of work terms in their own supply chains. Furthermore, 
these record keeping requirements would be an essential feature of a supply chain responsibility 
system because they would allow regulators to monitor and enhance compliance by supply chain 
participants with the system.109  Without such a clause it would be much more difficult for 
regulators to secure compliance by all supply chain participants with their responsibilities under 
the order because the records would be the main evidence used to ascertain whether or not 
supply chain participants had complied with their obligations. 
Under the Act, the relevant union is empowered to initiate enforcement proceedings for 
contraventions of road safety remuneration orders, and to exercise powers of inspection for 
suspected contraventions of the Act or an enforceable instrument.110 The Fair Work 
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Ombudsman also has wide-ranging enforcement powers under the Act.111 Thus both the 
government regulator and the relevant union are charged with the supervisory task of monitoring 
compliance by supply chain participants. This is consistent with the collaborative, tripartite 
approach to enforcement of employment standards which has previously existed in Australia.112 
Historically the task of enforcing minimum employment standards has largely been left up to 
unions, (although in recent years the Fair Work Ombudsman has been a more active litigant).  
There is some indication that in the textile, clothing and footwear industry, the relevant union has 
been able to adequately monitor supply chain participants to ensure compliance with legislative 
requirements.113 However, questions remain as to whether the relevant union and government 
regulator will have adequate resources to properly oversee the implementation of tribunal orders 
in the road transport industry, especially in relation to drivers who are not union members and 
self-employed drivers.  
Finally, under current supply chain arrangements in the road transport industry, transport 
operators can be under significant financial pressure — so much so, that some small operators 
cannot afford to make the legally required payments to the drivers they directly engage.114 
Insolvency is common amongst small operators in the industry. 115 The TWU’s proposed right of 
recovery for any unpaid amounts owed to the driver against any relevant participant in the supply 
chain, including the retailer client,116 is arguably a crucial part of a supply chain accountability 
system in the road transport industry because it gives drivers the opportunity to retrieve wages 
from the top of the supply chain in situations where operators in the middle of the chain —the 
road transport industry operators — experience financial difficulties.117 Such a right of recovery 
has been in place for decades for outworkers in clothing supply chains – without any observable 
adverse consequences.118  
C. The Tribunal’s Final Order 
None of these TWU amendments designed to address supply chain pressures emanating from 
retail clients were included in the tribunal’s final order. Although, as we have noted, the Act 
clearly empowers the tribunal to make an order imposing substantive obligations about the pay 
and safety of road transport workers on all participants in the supply chain, the first order made 
by the tribunal in the long distance and retail sector119 mainly focussed on the obligations of 
employers and direct hirers with only a few, weak, provisions covering road transport industry 
clients.  
                                                            
111 Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) ss 73-75. 
112 Rawling and Kaine, above n 10 at 255. 
113 Interview with union official. 
114 Interview with union official. 
115 Quinlan, above n 1, 133; Witness statement of Professor Michael Quinlan, in the matter of Road 
Safety Remuneration Order – Application by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety 
Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1)(30 July 2013) paras 29-30. 
116 Transport Workers Union of Australia, ‘Draft Road Safety Remuneration (Retail Sector) Order’, 
Submission in Re Annual Work Program [2012] RSRTFB 3, 4 March 2013 proposed cl 10.4. 
117 Interview with union official. 
118 Nossar, Johnstone, Macklin and Rawling, above n 14. 
119  The livestock and bulk grain sectors were omitted from the final order. 
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In relation to consignor and consignee contracting practices, the full bench noted that the ANRA 
raised the issue of the ‘potential breadth’ of application of the draft order obligations.120 The 
tribunal retained a narrower form of clause 7.4 of the draft order in clause 8 of the final order by 
largely adopted the ‘wording for such a clause proposed by the ANRA and Coles’.121   The 
resulting clause 8 of the final order reads: 
A participant in the supply chain in relation to a road transport driver must take reasonable 
measures to ensure that any contract it has with another participant in the supply chain 
contains provisions which are relevantly consistent with the requirements of this order. 
As we have already noted, a consignor and consignee of freight transported by road is a 
participant in the supply chain so this clause clearly applies to retailer consignors and consignees.  
Influenced, however, by submissions from retailers, the change from the draft order to the final 
order narrowed the range of contracts covered by this requirement from ‘any contract for the 
provision of a road transport service’122 to ‘any contract it has with another participant in the 
supply chain’123. This is a clear narrowing of the clause. There are two other aspects to the final 
clause, maintained from the draft order, that are potentially even more problematic.  First, as we 
have argued in our discussion of the draft order, the main weakness of the clause is that it only 
requires retail clients to have contracts the terms of which are consistent with the tribunal order, 
and does not require them to take action to ensure compliance with the order. This clause can be 
contrasted with Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Long Distance Truck Driver 
Fatigue) Regulation 2005 (NSW) which imposed an actual prohibition on clients contracting with 
a transport company unless the consignor or consignee has satisfied itself that delivery timetables 
are reasonable for drivers and that there is a safe driving plan in place.124 Second, perhaps the 
deepest problem with the new clause 8 is that there is a real concern about the lack of substance 
to client responsibility under the clause. Absent a beneficial reading of the clause, the phrase 
‘relevantly consistent with this order’ means that clause 8 adds little or nothing to retail consignor 
and consignee obligations under the order because the order does not impose any other major 
requirements upon them elsewhere in the order — the major client obligation for safe driving 
plans was deleted, as we discuss further below. Indeed, clause 8 might prove to be circular and of 
little effect because it imposes a requirement to contract which only has to be consistent with the 
supply chain participant’s very same requirement to contract under clause 8. 
As noted above, after considering the evidence given by interested parties on safe driving plans 
— including Coles’ evidence that the draft order safe driving plan obligations of consignors and 
                                                            
120 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Decision [2013] RSRTFB 7 (17 December 2013) para 153. 
121 Ibid para 189. 
122 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Draft Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations 
Road Safety Remuneration Order 2013, (12 July 2013) cl 7.4. 
123 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Decision [2013] RSRTFB 7 (17 December 2013) cl 8. 
124 Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Long Distance Truck Driver Fatigue) Regulation 2005 
(NSW) cl 81C.  See Igor Nossar, ‘Cross-Jurisdictional Regulation of Commercial Contracts for Work 
Beyond the Traditional Relationship’ in Chris Arup, Peter Gahan, John Howe, Richard Johnstone, 
Richard Mitchell and Anthony O’Donnell (eds),Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation: Essays on the 
Construction, Constitution and Regulation of Labour Markets and Work Relationships (Federation Press, 2006). 
This regulation did not, however, address issues of pay. 
 
 
   Page 22 
consignees were unnecessary, unreasonable or unduly burdensome125— the full bench omitted 
from the final order any substantive requirement on retail clients to consult over safe driving 
plans and take reasonable steps to ensure road transport services be performed in accordance 
with safe driving plans. The TWU’s proposed additions to the safe driving plan obligations of 
consignors and consignees were also omitted. The major safe driving plan obligations under the 
order fall upon direct employers and hirers and road transport drivers.126 In its provisions for safe 
driving plans, it appears that the tribunal followed the exact path that the TWU had argued it 
should not take; that is, the order imposed obligations on transport companies and drivers 
without addressing client power and influence.127 The remaining obligations of supply chain 
participants involve supply chain participants in the safe driving plan process but not in a direct 
and meaningful manner,128 and are watered down versions of the provisions in the draft order. 
Whereas under the draft order there was a mandatory obligation on supply chain participants to 
witness a safe driving plan,129 the final order only required a supply chain participant to witness a 
safe driving plan ‘where practicable’.130 Under clause 10.6 the safe driving plan must state ‘known 
participants in the supply chain’. Each supply chain participant is to be identified – a clear 
improvement on the previous situation – but there is (as yet) no enforceable obligation as against 
that participant. 
Notably the final order retained the provision that a supply chain participant must not take 
adverse action against a road transport driver.131 This significantly expands existing statutory 
adverse action rights of road transport drivers so that they may now make a claim against a 
retailer who is a consignor or consignee. However, this is a potential liability of a supply chain 
participant which would require a driver to make a claim to enforce their rights.  In other words, 
this is a reactive provision, to be enforced by a private individual. This contrasts with arguably 
more effective preventive requirements that, we suggest, could be imposed on consignors and 
consignees consistently and pro-actively to address driver safety issues before the commencement of 
work (such as safe driving plan requirements) or client requirements to oversee their supply chains to 
ensure that driver have legal, safe terms and conditions and take action, including termination, 
where transport operators are not complying with pay and safety requirements. 
The final order imposes requirements upon hirers of contract drivers to pay drivers within 30 
days of receipt of the driver invoice.132 On the face of it, this is an essential provision. Its 
effectiveness, however, depends on small transport operators having the financial capacity to pay 
                                                            
125 Para 267 of the Full Bench decision. 
126 See Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations Road 
Safety Remuneration Order 2014, PR350280, 17 December 2013, cl 10. 
127 Transport Workers Union of Australia ‘Outline of Submissions for the TWU’ submission in Road 
Safety Remuneration Order – Application by Transport Workers Union of Australia, Road Safety 
Remuneration Tribunal (RSRT 2013/1)(1 August 2013) para 11. 
128 Interview with union official. 
129 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Draft Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations 
Road Safety Remuneration Order 2013, (12 July 2013) cl 11.6. 
130 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations Road 
Safety Remuneration Order 2014, PR350280, 17 December 2013, cl 10.8. 
131 Ibid cl 6. 
132 Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal Road Transport and Distribution and Long Distance Operations Road 
Safety Remuneration Order 2014, PR350280, 17 December 2013, cl 9.1. 
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drivers. There is nothing in the order requiring road transport industry clients to ensure that 
enough funds flow down the chain so that all transport operators have the capacity to pay rates 
to drivers.133 Thus transport operators, including small operators under significant financial 
pressures, have an additional burden under the order without any concomitant measure to lift the 
commercial pressures on transport operators from clients.134 
In the face of objections by clients to substantive obligations being imposed upon them, it 
appears the tribunal has taken an overly cautious approach in this first tribunal matter to 
regulating the road transport supply chain. 
This cautious approach appears to stand in direct contrast to the powers of the tribunal under the 
Act to make orders binding supply chain participants and the role imposed on the tribunal to 
fulfil the objectives of: removing remuneration-related incentives, pressures and practices that 
contribute to unsafe work practices;135 developing and applying enforceable standards throughout 
the road transport supply chain to ensure the safety of road transport workers;136 and ensuring 
that hirers of road transport drivers and participants in the supply chain take responsibility for 
implementing and maintaining those standards.137  
 As we have demonstrated at the beginning of this article, a key contributor to low pay and poor 
safety in the road transport industry is the economic pressure emanating from the top of the 
supply chain.138 Clearly the tribunal was aware that relevant government reports on the road 
transport industry specify the clients’ role in affecting the parameters of working conditions but 
the tribunal’s first order did not adequately address client pressures. If the tribunal was concerned 
about imposing requirements on retail consignees for inbound freight movements where a 
retailer simply receives the freight, it was open to it to impose obligations on retailers as 
consignees to the extent that they controlled those freight movements. This kind of approach was 
taken under the federal Fair Work Act 2009’s special provisions for TCF outworkers. There, an 
outworker claim for unpaid remuneration could potentially be made against a retailer unless the 
retailer did not have any ‘right to supervise or otherwise control the performance of work’ before 
goods were delivered to the retailer.139  Regulating retailers to the extent that they have control as 
consignors and as consignees would have maintained the element of caution the tribunal desired 
without abandoning the task of crafting substantive supply chain obligations for road transport 
industry clients.  
Even then, this type of approach is a fall back option for a reluctant tribunal and not an ideal 
approach to fully achieve the objectives of the Act. We have a fundamental concern with 
imposing an obligation to the extent of control, given that prior research indicates that one of the 
reasons for the supply chain outsourcing of work by influential business controllers (such as large 
road transport industry clients) is to reduce the cost associated with, and to distance themselves 
                                                            
133 Interview with union official. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth), s 3(b).  
136 Ibid s 3(d). 
137 Ibid s 3(e). 
138 Quinlan, above n 1, 20, 152-153, 162. 
139 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), s 789CA(5)(b). 
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from, legal responsibilities for the terms and conditions of workers.140 Crafting an order to 
impose an obligation commensurate with the existing control of consignors and consignees 
might fall into the trap of further encouraging consignors and consignees to distance themselves 
from measures to reduce terms and conditions in their own supply chains. Rather, we argue that 
orders should provide road transport consignors and consignees with incentives to know and 
make transparent their own supply chains and to regulate their supply chains to address the issues 
of low pay and poor safety.141  
The Liberal-National Party Coalition’s federal workplace law policy released in May 2013 
foreshadowed an urgent review of the tribunal.  The review commenced on 20 November 2013, 
shortly after the election of the federal Coalition government and was timetabled to conclude in 
the first quarter of 2014. Although the effect of this review on tribunal members is unknown, 
their decisions in making this first order were made in the shadow of this review and may have 
shaped their deliberations and the form of the final order. The election of a government 
avowedly hostile to the newly created tribunal may explain why the tribunal did not adequately 
address supply chain pressures in the first order. The full bench might have hoped that restraint 
in the proceedings would calm those campaigning to abolish the tribunal. Whether it was this 
political pressure or simply a reluctance to place economic obligations on powerful commercial 
interests at the top of the road transport supply chain for the first time, the tribunal is yet to fully 
implement the Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 as intended by Parliament. If the tribunal is not 
abolished by the Coalition federal government, it will get the opportunity in subsequent orders 
and amendments to the retail and long distance order to put in place regulation to properly 
address the commercial pressures emanating down the supply chain by imposing substantive 
obligations on parties throughout the chain including large consignors and consignees at the top 
of the chain. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal proceedings and the resulting 
first order applying to the retail and long distance sectors of the road transport industry. After 
considering the evidence of interested parties, including large consignors and consignees, the 
tribunal imposed partial and very weak obligations on those consignors and consignees. It 
rejected arguments to place more substantive obligations on all supply chain participants, 
arguments which we believe would more effectively address issues of low pay and poor safety 
experienced by road transport drivers. The tribunal order primarily imposes obligations on direct 
work providers and drivers without making large powerful clients of the industry substantively 
responsible for driver pay and safety. We argue that the tribunal’s order for the retail and long 
distance sectors could have more comprehensively fulfilled the objectives of the Act by more 
directly addressing the root causes of low pay and poor safety in the road transport industry. 
                                                            
140 See for example, Rawling and Kaine, above n 10, 241; David Weil, ‘Enforcing Labour Standards in 
Fissured Workplaces: The US Experience’ (2011) 22 Economic and Labour Relations Review 33, 34. 
141 Note that the TCF industry retailer obligation to the extent of retailer control was in relation to a right 
of recovery only and there are other provisions in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) for the making of a 
mandatory code for retailers in the TCF sector: see Division 4, Part 6-4A of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth). 
The existing TCF mandatory retailer codes in New South Wales and South Australia impose obligations 
upon retailers without any reference to the extent of retailer control: see Rawling, above n 14. 
 
 
   Page 25 
Even in the face of political pressures and pressures from large economic interests, the tribunal 
has the task of removing remuneration-related incentives, pressures and practices that contribute 
to unsafe work practices;142 and developing and applying enforceable standards throughout the 
road transport supply chain to ensure the safety of road transport workers.143 The Road Safety 
Remuneration Tribunal is an important initiative with the potential to address economic 
pressures passed down road transport supply chains and to fully implement what has been 
identified in the literature144 as an Australian model of supply chain regulation. If the tribunal is 
abolished without the opportunity to do this, a major opportunity for effective legal redress to 
the exploitation of road transport supply chain labour will be lost. 
                                                            
142 Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012, s 3(b).  
143 Ibid s 3(d). 
144 See in particular Nossar, above n 15. 
